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As if that wasn’t enough, we also have 5 important employment cases for you from decisions in the Court of Appeal and Employment Appeal Tribunal in the last few months (and we detail the implications of these cases for employers).
So, step away from those easter eggs and have a read!
LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ACT 2025
The Employment Rights Bill was published on 10 October 2024 (see our blogs on this here and here) and updates here and here. The Bill was passed on 16 December 2025 and has now become the Employment Rights Act 2025 (ERA 2025) as updated here. Many of its key provisions are coming into force this year, including this April.
As well as the usual April changes to employment law that we’re used to, April 2026 brings additional measures being introduced under ERA 2025, including:
Paternity Leave
From 6 April, statutory paternity leave will become a day one right i.e. employees can take the leave without any minimum service requirement. Also, it will be able to be taken after a period of shared parental leave.
This applies when the EWC (Expected Week of Childbirth) or adoption placement begins on or after 5 April 2026, or when the child is born after this date. However, statutory paternity pay is not changing: employees must still have 26 weeks’ service by the 15th week before the EWC and meet minimum earnings thresholds.
Action: Review and update your paternity leave and shared parental leave policies to reflect these changes and let your managers know.
Parental Leave
From 6 April, unpaid parental leave will also become a day one right (rather than the previous one year service requirement). Eligible parents on 6 April 2026 have been able to give notice since 18 February. They must provide at least 21 days’ notice to their employer. However, the leave remains capped at 18 weeks per child in total and only 4 of these weeks may be taken per year.
Action: Review and update your parental leave policies to reflect these changes and inform your managers.
Bereaved Partner’s Paternity Leave (BPPL)
From 6 April, BPPL allows employees up to 52 weeks of unpaid leave if their partner (mother or primary adopter) dies within the first year of a child’s life or adoption and the employee has primary responsibility for the child.
The leave must be taken as a single continuous period and must normally be completed within the child’s first year (of birth or adoption). However, where the bereavement occurs less than 14 days before the end of that period, the employee will be allowed an extension to take up to 14 days of BPPL. Employees may also take up to 10 keeping in touch (KIT) days during their leave.
Collective redundancy consultation
From 6 April, the maximum protective award for failure to consult will double from 90 to 180 days’ gross pay per affected employee. This substantially increases potential liability, particularly in large-scale redundancy exercises, and places greater emphasis on early identification of consultation triggers, timely engagement and thorough documentation.
Action: To help avoid the financial risk of increased protective awards: Review your redundancy procedures; focus on identifying trigger points early; ensure consultation starts in good time; carefully document decision-making and ensure your senior leadership understand when consultation obligations are triggered and the risk of delay.
Whistleblowing
From 6 April, complaints about sexual harassment will amount to a ‘qualifying disclosure’. In other words, they are being added to the list of wrongdoing that can amount to a whistleblowing protected disclosure (alongside matters such as criminal offences, breaches of legal obligations, miscarriages of justice, risks to health and safety, and environmental damage) provided the employee reasonably believes the conduct has (or is likely to) occur and that the disclosure is made in the public interest.
Action: Employers will need to ensure consistency between whistleblowing, grievance, and harassment procedures and train managers to recognise and handle these issues appropriately from the outset.
Sick Pay
From 6 April, Statutory Sick Pay (SSP) will become payable from the first day of absence (removing the current waiting period). The lower earnings limit will no longer apply, and the amount payable to employees will be the lower of the SSP rate or 80% of their normal weekly earnings.
Action: Update payroll systems, sick pay policies and references in staff handbooks and employment contracts (especially where they reference waiting days). Test payroll changes in advance to avoid payroll errors and employee complaints.
Trade union recognition
From 6 April, trade union recognition rules are shifting to make it easier for unions to be officially recognised in a workplace, including:
Additional procedural changes limit the ability of employers to influence the process, including restrictions on who can vote and earlier application of unfair practice rules.
Action: Employers without recognised trade unions should assess workforce consultation and communication strategies in light of easier statutory recognition. Consider whether these remain fit for purpose and, if not, make the appropriate changes. Remember also that since 18 February 2026, the rules for industrial action have been simplified and dismissal for taking part in protected industrial action is now automatically unfair for the full duration of that action (removing the previous 12-week limit on protection).
Fair Work Agency
On 7 April 2026, the Government’s new Fair Work Agency (FWA) starts operating. The FWA brings together existing enforcement functions into a single body. It will enforce National Minimum Wage (NMW) compliance, holiday pay and statutory sick pay. It will also have the power to take enforcement action for individual employees and bring Tribunal claims on their behalf.
Action: Audit payroll to ensure you are paying NMW, holiday and SSP correctly and complying with the statutory rules – particularly in relation to irregular, zero-hours, or agency workers. Maintain detailed, accessible records of working hours, holiday pay, and sick pay in case the FWA investigates. Lack of, or poor, records could lead to penalties.
Statutory rates
As ever, April also brings increased statutory rates. The new figures for NMW, SSP and family leave are set out in our December 2025 Newsletter here.
Case 1 = EMPLOYMENT STATUS AND VOLUNTEERS
Summary: Can a volunteer be a ‘worker’ in relation to activities for which they are paid?
Yes, says the Court of Appeal in Maritime and Coastguard Agency v Groom, available here (which upholds the EAT’s decision on which we updated you here).
Background: There are three main types of employment status: employee, worker and self-employed. Getting this right matters because it determines an individual’s legal rights. Employees have the most rights, the self-employed the least, and workers fall somewhere in between.
A ‘worker’ is broadly someone who personally provides services under a contract, but is not genuinely running their own business with the employer as a client. Workers are entitled to key protections such as the National Living Wage, paid holiday and accompaniment at disciplinary or grievance hearings. Ultimately, employment status depends on the reality of the working relationship in practice, not just what the contract says.
Facts: Mr Groom, the volunteer, was a ‘coastal rescue officer’ for the Coastal Rescue Service (the rescue service). The volunteer handbook described his relationship with the rescue service as a ‘voluntary two-way commitment where no contract of employment exists’.
Mr Groom (in common with all volunteers) was expected to comply with a code of conduct which, amongst other things, required coastal rescue officers to attend a number of training sessions and to maintain a reasonable level of attendance at incidents. The code of conduct also said that volunteers could submit monthly payment claims for certain activities to cover minor costs and to compensate volunteers for disruption to their personal life caused by unsocial hours call-outs. Payments included payment for time (at an hourly rate of remuneration), travel and expenses with a calculation of amounts payable for different specified things, at different rates for different roles. Payment was by payslip and P60s were issued at the end of tax year.
The rescue service terminated the relationship with Mr Groom following a disciplinary hearing (and he was subsequently issued with a P45). Mr Groom brought a Tribunal claim on the basis that the rescue service had failed to allow him to be accompanied to the disciplinary hearing. To qualify for this right, he needed to be classified as a ‘worker’.
As it was accepted that Mr Groom was required to personally perform his volunteer services (and the rescue service was not a customer or client) the only issue for the Tribunal to consider was whether a contract existed.
Tribunal decision: The Tribunal said that Mr Groom was not a ‘worker’ as he did not have a contract with the rescue service. This was because there was no automatic right to remuneration for any activity and, in reality, many volunteers never claimed for this. Mr Groom appealed to the EAT.
EAT decision: The EAT allowed Mr Groom’s appeal. It said there was a contract in place when Mr Groom was carrying out activities that attracted a right of remuneration.
The EAT said that the phrase ‘two-way commitment’ in the volunteer handbook and the specified levels of training and attendance at incidents indicated some form of mutual obligation. It was irrelevant that Mr Groom had to apply for the remuneration – this was no more than a payment mechanism and had no impact on the issue of his status. It was also irrelevant that other volunteers hadn’t made claims for payment. The rescue service appealed.
Court of Appeal decision: The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the EAT’s decision. The Court emphasised that it was not deciding whether Mr Groom was an employee, nor whether there was an overarching contract between call-outs. The sole question was whether, on each occasion he attended an activity that entitled him to claim payment, he was a worker.
The Court said that a contract came into effect each time Mr Groom undertook an activity for which payment was promised. At those moments, there was a classic wage–work bargain: he performed work personally and the rescue agency was obliged to pay if he submitted a claim. Mutuality of obligation existed during those paid activities, even though there was no overarching ‘umbrella’ contract governing the relationship as a whole.
Implications: This decision has important implications for charities and other organisations that rely on volunteers. It highlights the risk that certain arrangements – particularly where payments are involved – can give rise to worker status and, in turn, statutory rights.
A key takeaway is that labels and written agreements are not decisive. As seen in Groom, courts will look beyond the documentation to the reality of the relationship. Simply describing someone as a ‘volunteer’ or stating that they are not a worker will not prevent worker status if, in practice, there is a wage/work bargain.
Payments are a key risk area. Genuine expenses are usually safe, but payments linked to time, availability or disruption may point towards worker status, especially if there is any entitlement to pay.
Control also matters. Even if volunteers can choose whether to accept work, if they are closely managed and paid for their time whilst working, they may be treated as ‘workers’.
Overall, organisations that use volunteers should review arrangements carefully and how they are documented. Take care before deciding that a volunteer is not a worker and denying statutory rights. Even arrangements described as ‘voluntary’ can give rise to worker status – particularly if payment is part of the deal; even if this is irregular.
EAT CASES
Case 2 = REDUNDANCY AND COLLECTIVE CONSULATION
Summary: Do employers need to consider past redundancies when deciding if collective consultation threshold is met?
No, says the EAT in Micro-Focus Ltd v Mr James Mildenhall (available here) the threshold is based on the number of redundancies proposed at that time.
Background: Whenever a business is looking to make multiple redundancies, it must give consideration to whether the obligation to collectively consult has been triggered. Where 20 or more redundancies are proposed at an ‘establishment’ within a 90-day period then there is an obligation to collectively consult for at least 30 days. Where 100 or more redundancies are proposed, that period is extended to 45 days. Failure to comply with this obligation can lead to a protective award of up to 90 days’ gross pay (uncapped) for each employee. This is due to increase to 180 days’ gross pay (uncapped) on 6 April 2026 under the Employment Rights Act 2025 (see ‘April changes’).
In 2020, the ECJ held in UQ v Marclean Technologies that when determining whether collective consultation is required, the reference period is 90 consecutive days during which the relevant dismissal took place and in which the employer dismissed the greatest number of employees.
Traditionally, the concept of ‘proposing to dismiss’ under the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULRCA) was understood as looking forward -focusing on planned future redundancies. However, in recent years, Tribunals have interpreted Marclean more broadly, requiring employers to look both forwards and backwards from a particular dismissal to assess whether the threshold of 20 dismissals is met within a rolling 90-day period.
This interpretation has created practical difficulties for employers, who have had to track and combine earlier and later redundancies across a moving 90-day window to determine whether the obligation to collectively consult is triggered.
Facts: The employee, Mr Mildenhall, headed the Business Intelligence and Reporting team at Micro Focus, an international IT company. He was dismissed for redundancy as part of a UK-wide reorganisation across different group companies, during which redundancy proposals emerged at different points in time.
The employee brought claims for unfair dismissal and for a protective award under s188 TULRCA for failure to carry out collective consultation. He argued that spreadsheet evidence showed that the employer had proposed to make 45 employees redundant within a 90-day period.
Tribunal decision: The Tribunal upheld the employee’s claim, finding that the statutory duty to collectively consult had been triggered. Applying a ‘forwards and backwards’ approach (see Background), it held that all redundancies within a rolling 90-day period should be aggregated, including the employee’s dismissal as well as earlier and later groups of employees.
In addition, the Tribunal said that although the redundancies took place across the wider corporate group, Micro Focus acted as the ‘de facto’ employer of all UK staff and as such all redundancies across the group would count towards the collective consultation threshold. Micro Focus appealed to the EAT.
EAT decision: The EAT overturned the Tribunal’s decision. It said the obligation to collectively consult is not determined by looking forwards and backwards to assess the number of redundancies that have actually taken place within the 90-day period. The correct test remains a forward-looking assessment based on the employer’s plans or ‘proposals’ at the time. I.e. whether 20 or more redundancies were ‘proposed’ requires a focus on what the employer was proposing in the future at the material time of the proposal. There is no obligation to look backwards 90 days to determine whether the trigger had been met.
Further, only redundancies of employees who have a contract of employment with the employer need to be counted towards the threshold. Redundancies across the wider corporate group do not need to be included in the threshold.
However, the EAT noted that the concept of ‘proposing’ is not to be tied to a single moment in time and highlighted that an employer who proposes, say six dismissals on Monday, seven on Tuesday and eight on Wednesday may readily be said to be ‘proposing’ 21 redundancies that week. The EAT confirmed that each case will be a question of fact for the Tribunal to decide whether the consultation threshold has been met.
Implications: This is good news for employers, as it confirms that past dismissals do not need to be taken into account when assessing whether the threshold for collective consultation has been met. This is particularly important where redundancies occur in separate tranches due to changing or unforeseen circumstances.
However, the EAT also made clear that ‘proposing’ redundancies is not a single fixed moment. Employers must therefore be able to produce contemporaneous evidence showing what was proposed, when, and – where relevant – why those proposals changed. Without a clear audit trail, there is a real risk that a Tribunal may conclude that 20 or more redundancies were in fact proposed from the outset, triggering collective consultation obligations that were not complied with.
In practice, employers should take a pragmatic approach – remain open to commencing collective consultation if plans evolve and further redundancies are envisaged. Keeping clear and accurate records of proposals, including any changes over time, will be invaluable in defending a Tribunal claim.
Finally, employers should not treat this decision as an opportunity to stagger redundancies artificially in order to avoid collective consultation obligations. The EAT has advised Tribunals to watch out for this!
Case 3 = UNFAIR DISMISSAL – PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
Summary: Can a less than perfect disciplinary process result in a fair dismissal?
Yes, says the EAT in Lamb v Teva UK (available here). Tribunals should look at the process as a whole rather than focusing on minor flaws. Employers are expected to carry out a reasonable investigation, but the law does not require perfection.
Facts: The employee, Mr Lamb, was an engineering supervisor with electronic training. He became aware of an electrical fault with a charger used on workplace equipment. Under the employer’s health and safety procedures, the charger should have been locked off and taken out of use until repaired. The employee failed to do so and later confirmed the area was safe. A contractor subsequently suffered a (potentially fatal) electric shock. The employee was dismissed for gross misconduct.
The employee brought a claim for unfair dismissal. He argued that the process was flawed because both the investigator and the note-taker were also witnesses; key CCTV footage was disclosed late and a manager (but not the disciplinary manager) had allegedly said he was ‘done at the business’ before the outcome.
Tribunal decision: The Tribunal said that, despite some procedural shortcomings, the dismissal was fair. The employee appealed.
EAT decision: The EAT upheld the Tribunal’s decision that the dismissal was fair. It emphasised that procedural fairness is assessed in the round. Tribunals should look at the overall process rather than isolating individual imperfections and while employers must carry out a reasonable investigation, the law does not require perfection.
In respect of this case, the EAT confirmed that the involvement of two witnesses as investigator and note-taker did not automatically make the dismissal unfair, particularly given they were not the decision-makers. It also noted that the employee did not object to the late evidence and that it did not materially alter the allegations. Comments about the likely outcome, while unhelpful, were not made by the decision-maker (and were understandable given the seriousness of the incident).
Implications: This case highlights the practical way tribunals look at disciplinary procedures. The main question is whether the process, taken as a whole, is within the range of reasonable responses.
That said, even if the odd slip-up won’t necessarily be fatal, getting the basics right still matters. Simple steps – like keeping investigations independent from the disciplinary process, sharing evidence on time, and clearly separating the roles of HR, witnesses and decision-makers – can go a long way to avoiding the risk of unfair dismissal.
This is likely to become even more significant when qualifying service for bringing unfair dismissal claims is reduced to six months from 1 January 2027 under ERA 2025.
Case update 4 = UNFAIR DISMISSAL AND REASON FOR DISMISSAL
Summary: In conduct unfair dismissal claims, can a Tribunal take into account what a decision-maker might or could have decided?
No, says the EAT in Chand v EE (available here). Tribunals must focus solely on what they actually decided.
Facts: The employee, Ms Chand, had 16 years’ service as a Senior Customer Advisor. She was dismissed for gross misconduct following four incidents involving customer accounts. The employer concluded that each incident involved fraudulent conduct and that the relationship of trust and confidence had been irreparably damaged. The employee accepted that she had made errors, but denied any dishonesty. The employee brought a claim for unfair dismissal.
Tribunal decision: The Tribunal held that the employer did not have reasonable grounds for believing that any of the four incidents amounted to fraud. However, it held that one of the incidents constituted a serious breach of policy which, taken in isolation, was capable of amounting to gross misconduct. On that basis, the Tribunal concluded that the dismissal was fair. The employee appealed and the employer cross-appealed against the finding that its belief in fraud was not reasonably held.
EAT decision: The EAT dismissed the employer’s cross-appeal. It held that the Tribunal had undertaken a detailed analysis of the evidence available to the decision-maker and was entitled to conclude that there were no reasonable grounds for a belief in fraud.
The EAT allowed the employee’s appeal and substituted a finding of unfair dismissal. The EAT emphasised that, in cases of conduct dismissal, a Tribunal must identify the employer’s actual principal reason for dismissal. This requires an examination of what the decision-maker in fact decided, rather than what they could have decided.
On the Tribunal’s own findings, the employer’s reason for dismissal was a composite one. It found that the dismissing officer had not viewed each of the allegations separately and said that if there had been fewer allegations, then the employee’s length of service may have made a difference to their decision. The Tribunal had not therefore made any finding that the employer’s sole or principal reason for dismissal was the allegation of a serious breach of policy.
While that breach could have been a reason for dismissal, it was not the employer’s actual reason for dismissal. The employer’s decision was based on the belief that all four allegations amounted to fraud. This was not based on reasonable grounds and therefore the only conclusion open to the Tribunal was that the dismissal was unfair.
The EAT therefore substituted a finding of unfair dismissal and remitted the case for a remedy hearing.
Implications: Tribunals are required to scrutinise the decision-maker’s reasoning at the time of dismissal. It is not sufficient that one aspect of the conduct might, when viewed in isolation, have justified dismissal if that was not in fact the principal reason relied upon.
This is a good reminder for employers that:
Combined reasons rise or fall together: Where dismissal is based on multiple allegations, they must be considered as a whole. If a central element (such as fraud) is not reasonably supported by evidence, the dismissal is likely to be unfair.
Serious allegations need solid evidence: Allegations of dishonesty or fraud must be backed by clear evidence; relying on any allegation which is unproven can weaken an otherwise defensible decision.
No fallback on lesser reasons: A dismissal cannot be justified after the fact by relying on a lesser allegation if that was not the employer’s true reason at the time.
Case update 5 = DISCRIMINATION – TRANS EMPLOYEES AND SINGLE SEX SPACES
Summary: Should employers allow trans employees to use single sex spaces based on their gender identity, rather than based on their biological sex?
No, says the Tribunal in Hutchinson and others v County Durham and Darlington NHS Foundation Trust (available here).
Background: The Supreme Court’s judgment in For Women Scotland established that a ‘man’ under Equality Act 2010 (EA 2010) is a biological man and a ‘woman’ is a biological woman. A trans man (with or without a gender reassignment certificate (GRC)) remains a ‘woman’ under EA 2010 and a trans woman (with or without a GRC) remains a ‘man’ under EA 2010. This meant that all of the protections and rules set out in EA 2010 applied based on the biological sex of the individual. For more information on this decision see our update here.
Facts: The employer, County Durham and Darlington NHS Trust, operated a policy (‘Transitioning in the Workplace’) permitting transitioning employees to use single-sex spaces, such as changing rooms, in line with their self-declared gender identity rather than their biological sex.
A trans woman employed by the Trust began using the female changing rooms. Ms Hutchinson and several other female employees who also used those facilities raised concerns. The Trust quoted its policy in response to the complaints and did not adequately address these. It instead criticised the employees, who were told they needed to be educated on trans rights and to broaden their mindsets.
The employees brought discrimination claims including:
Tribunal decision:
Applying For Women Scotland, the Tribunal held:
The Tribunal said that the trans woman should instead have been provided with ‘alternative, suitable and dignified facilities’, rather than permitting her to use the female changing room. Also that expecting the trans woman to use male facilities may also have had the affect of violating her dignity and potentially her Article 8 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) right to a private life.
Implications: This case highlights the highly sensitive and complex issues surrounding the use of single-sex facilities by trans individuals and the challenges employers face in balancing the rights of employees with competing protected characteristics. A clear, well-drafted equality, diversity and inclusion policy is essential to support and guide decision-making.
Although Hutchinson will be of particular interest to employers reviewing their policies on single-sex facilities, it is important to recognise that as it is only a Tribunal-level decision, it is not binding.
Further guidance is expected when the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) publishes its revised Code of Practice for Services, anticipated this year. In the meantime, employers should continue to mainly rely on the principles set out in For Women Scotland (as set out in our update here) and the current EHRC guidance which advises employers to provide sufficient single-sex spaces but also adequate facilities for trans employees. This is likely to be a matter of resources available to each employer, with large-scale employers expected to take more extensive steps than a small employer with few employees.
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