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Higgs v Farmors School
Summary: Ms Higgs (a Christian with gender-critical beliefs) was dismissed for posting comments on Facebook which the employer considered were homophobic and prejudiced against the LGBT community. She brought Tribunal claims for discrimination and harassment on grounds of religion or belief.
The Tribunal found that that Ms Higgs’ belief was a protected philosophical belief, but that she was not discriminated against because of it. She was not dismissed because of her protected beliefs, but due to the manner in which she expressed these on social media. Ms Higgs appealed.
The EAT said the Tribunal had not approached making its decision in the right way. The manner in which an employee expresses (or ‘manifests’) their beliefs can still be protected (from discrminatory disciplinary action or dismissal) if they are expressed in a lawful manner. The EAT returned the case to the Tribunal to reconsider, with guidance that it should consider whether the employer’s response was proportionate to the manifestation of the employee’s beliefs (i.e. the Facebook posts). (We cover the EAT’s decision in more detail here).
Ms Higgs’ appeal to the Court of Appeal concluded on 3 October 2024 and we await the written decision.
Implications: This is an important case to watch as it deals with the complex issue of the difference between holding a protected belief (for which an employee should not be discriminated against) and demonstrating or taking action as a result of (or ‘manifesting’) that belief.
Sometimes termed as ‘clash of rights’ cases, these issues can be tricky for employer’s to manage, given the need to balance protection for holding gender critical views against individuals with other protected characteristics.
Groom v Maritime & Coastguard Agency
Summary: Mr Groom (a volunteer for the coastal rescue service) was dismissed following a disciplinary hearing. He said that he was a ‘worker’ and therefore should have been allowed the right to be accompanied at a disciplinary hearing. The rescue service said he was not. In particular the Volunteer Handbook clarified that there was no contract of employment and the only payments made (other than expenses) had to be claimed for.
The Tribunal agreed there was no contract and that Mr Groom was not a ‘worker’.
The EAT overturned the Tribunal’s decision. It said there’s no firm rule that a volunteer cannot have worker status. In this case, Mr Groom was a ‘worker’ when he carried out paid activities. At that point there was a contract in place, irrespective of the payment process. Additionally, the Volunteer Handbook referred to a ‘two-way commitment’ and volunteers were required to attend training and (some) rescue situations. This demonstrated mutual obligation. The EAT also remitted the case back to the Tribunal to decide if Mr Groom was a ‘worker’ even when he was not carrying out paid activities. (We cover the EAT’s decision in more detail here).
The rescue service’s appeal to the Court of Appeal is due to be heard on 18 or 19 November 2025 (so a bit of a wait for this one).
Implications: This is a significant case in relation to worker status and, in particular, when volunteers maybe workers. It will be interesting to see if the Court of Appeal agrees with the EAT in respect of the importance of remuneration, or even if it considers that volunteers can obtain worker status without it.
5.0/5